Yearn — yvWBTC-1

Contract Addresses

Core yvWBTC-1 Contracts

Contract	Address	Type
yvWBTC-1 Vault	0x751F0cC6115410A3eE9eC92d08f46Ff6Da98b708	Yearn V3 Vault (v3.0.4), Vyper minimal proxy
Underlying asset (WBTC)	0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599	Wrapped Bitcoin (BitGo)
Accountant	0x5A74Cb32D36f2f517DB6f7b0A0591e09b22cDE69	Shared Yearn Accountant (0% mgmt, 10% perf)
Fee Recipient (Dumper)	0x590Dd9399bB53f1085097399C3265C7137c1C4Cf	Claims fees and routes to auctions/splitters

Governance Contracts (shared with all Yearn V3 risk-1 vaults)

Contract	Address	Configuration
Yearn V3 Role Manager	0xb3bd6B2E61753C311EFbCF0111f75D29706D9a41	Single instance for all category-1 vaults
Daddy / ySafe (Governance)	0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52	6-of-9 Gnosis Safe
Brain (Operations)	0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7	3-of-8 Gnosis Safe
Security	0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0	4-of-7 Gnosis Safe
Strategy Manager (Timelock)	0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336b7090767F367BF73	TimelockController — 7-day delay
Keeper	0x604e586F17cE106B64185A7a0d2c1Da5bAce711E	yHaaSRelayer — REPORTING only
Debt Allocator	0x1e9eB053228B1156831759401dE0E115356b8671	Minimal proxy — REPORTING + DEBT_MANAGER

Yearn V3 Infrastructure

Contract	Address
Vault Factory (v3.0.4)	0x770D0d1Fb036483Ed4AbB6d53c1C88fb277D812F
Vault Original (v3.0.4)	0xd8063123BBA3B480569244AE66BFE72B6c84b00d

Strategies (1 active in default queue, 100% deployed)

get_default_queue() returns [0x2bB005127069A0F0325Fb7370967E8A2b64FB77E] at block 25519096. The single attached strategy is a MetaMorpho V1_1 vault ("ymv-WBTC") deployed specifically for yvWBTC-1:

Contract	Address	Type
ymv-WBTC (MetaMorphoV1_1)	0x2bB005127069A0F0325Fb7370967E8A2b64FB77E	Morpho MetaMorpho ERC-4626 vault, immutable

Vault strategies(0x2bB0…) returns (activation=1779638639 [May 24, 2026], last_report=1783571039 [Jul 9, 2026], current_debt=47.5099 WBTC, max_debt=1000 WBTC). The strategy was activated 13 days after the May 11, 2026 snapshot, following a 7-day TimelockController proposal.

Strategy Protocol Dependencies

The MetaMorpho strategy allocates capital to Morpho Blue lending markets:

Contract	Address	Type
Morpho Blue	0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb	Immutable lending primitive (v1)
WBTC/LBTC Market (94.5% LLTV)	0xf6a056627a51e511ec7f48332421432ea6971fc148d8f3c451e14ea108026549	Active: 18.0% of TVL
WBTC/cbBTC Market (94.5% LLTV)	0x39d6cc9211d023cc16708a2378d821d394d8cfaa3640e3a4d4638d292e10035d	In queue, cap 500 WBTC, no position

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

Yearn V3 Core Audits

Auditor	Date	Scope	Report
Statemind	May 2, 2024	V3 Vaults (v3.0.0)	PDF
ChainSecurity	May 4, 2024	V3 Vaults + Tokenized Strategy (v3.0.0)	2 PDFs
yAcademy	Jun 2024	V3 Vaults (v3.0.1)	PDF

The v3.0.4 patch release (used by yvWBTC-1) was reviewed internally by the Yearn team rather than re-engaging external auditors. The diff from v3.0.2 is a minor patch-level change; the external audits cover the core architecture. Source: yearn-vaults-v3 GitHub releases.

Morpho Blue core contracts are immutable (no proxy, no upgrade mechanism). MetaMorpho V1_1 is also immutable. The historical Aave V3 attachment (which was revoked) is documented in the Historical Track Record below.

Strategy Review Process

All strategies pass through Yearn's 12-metric risk-scoring framework (RISK_FRAMEWORK.md). yvWBTC-1 is registered as Category 1 in the Role Manager (getCategory(vault) == 1), the strictest tier.

Bug Bounty

• Yearn (Immunefi): active, $200,000 max payout (Critical). https://immunefi.com/bounty/yearnfinance/
• Yearn (Sherlock): also listed at https://audits.sherlock.xyz/bug-bounties/30
• Underlying-protocol bug bounties: Morpho (Cantina) — $2,500,000 max payout (Critical)
• Safe Harbor (SEAL): Yearn is not listed on the SEAL Safe Harbor registry

On-Chain Complexity

Low — single strategy, single underlying lending protocol. The flow is:

yvWBTC-1 (ERC-4626) → MetaMorpho (ERC-4626) → Morpho Blue idle market + WBTC/LBTC lending market

Two ERC-4626 layers (vault + MetaMorpho) with Morpho Blue as the underlying lending primitive. No leverage, no looping, no cross-chain. Morpho Blue uses MorphoChainlinkOracleV2 for pricing (standard Chainlink feeds). Both the yvWBTC-1 vault and MetaMorpho strategy contract are immutable.

Historical Track Record

• Vault deployed: May 13, 2025 (deployment tx) — ~14 months in production
• TVL: 47.5099 WBTC (~$3.05M). WBTC TVL essentially flat year-over-year; USD TVL declined ~21% since May 2026 due to BTC price drop ($81,600 → $64,200)
• PPS trend: 1.000000 (deployment) → 1.000037 (May 11, 2026, mostly undeployed) → 1.000305 (July 12, 2026, ~49 days of yield since MetaMorpho strategy activated May 24, 2026)
• Security incidents: None known for this vault, Yearn V3, Morpho Blue, or MetaMorpho
• Strategy history:
  • May 18, 2025: Aave V3 WBTC Lender attached
  • Apr 27–May 5, 2026: Aave V3 WBTC Lender revoked (precautionary response to April 18 rsETH bridge exploit per Yearn team; causal attribution unverified)
  • May 11, 2026: Vault idle, default queue empty (last snapshot of previous report)
  • May 24, 2026: MetaMorpho V1_1 (ymv-WBTC) activated after 7-day TimelockController proposal. Funds deployed immediately
• Yearn V3 track record: V3 framework live since May 2024 (~26 months). No V3 vault exploits
• Morpho Blue track record: Live since Jan 2024 (~30 months). No exploits. ~$1B+ active markets

Yearn protocol TVL: ~$147M total across all chains (DeFiLlama, July 2026, down from ~$197.5M in April 2026).

Funds Management

yvWBTC-1 deploys all WBTC through a single MetaMorpho V1_1 strategy (ymv-WBTC). Within the strategy, ~82% of TVL is idle on Morpho Blue's idle market and ~18% is supplied as lending liquidity to the WBTC/LBTC Morpho Blue market.

Current State (snapshot)

• Total Assets: 47.50988862 WBTC
• Total Debt: 47.50988862 WBTC (100% deployed to strategy)
• Total Idle: 0 WBTC (at vault level)
• Capital utilization: 100% deployed (at vault level); 18.0% actually earning yield (at strategy level)
• Default queue length: 1 (MetaMorpho ymv-WBTC)

Strategy Breakdown

ymv-WBTC (MetaMorphoV1_1) — 0x2bB005127069A0F0325Fb7370967E8A2b64FB77E

Metric	Value
Strategy totalAssets	47.5105 WBTC
Yearn V3 maxDebt	1,000 WBTC (~$64M)
Yearn V3 currentDebt	47.5099 WBTC
Activation	May 24, 2026 (unix 1779638639)
Last report	Jul 9, 2026 (unix 1783571039)
MetaMorpho fee	0%
MetaMorpho timelock (curator cap changes)	3 days

Within the MetaMorpho strategy:

Venue	WBTC	% of TVL	Utilization	Strategy share of market
Morpho Blue idle market	38.96	82.0%	N/A (always liquid)	N/A (shared idle pool)
Morpho Blue WBTC/LBTC (94.5% LLTV)	8.55	18.0%	79.4%	95.2%
Morpho Blue WBTC/cbBTC (94.5% LLTV)	0	0%	~0%	N/A

Accessibility

• Deposits: Permissionless ERC-4626. Subject to 100,000 WBTC deposit limit (cap remains oversized — see Reassessment Triggers)
• Withdrawals: ERC-4626 withdraw → MetaMorpho redeem → Morpho Blue idle market withdrawal + LBTC market withdrawal. The 82% idle buffer enables large redemptions without touching the LBTC market
• No cooldown or lock period
• Fees: 0% management, 10% performance (vault); 0% MetaMorpho fee; Morpho Blue has no protocol fee
• Profit unlock: 5 days

Collateralization

• 100% on-chain WBTC backing — all TVL is deployed to the MetaMorpho strategy, which holds WBTC either as idle (82%) or as Morpho Blue supply positions (18%)
• Collateral quality: The underlying asset is WBTC (BitGo-custodied wrapped BTC). The LBTC exposure is through over-collateralized lending at 94.5% LLTV — the strategy lends WBTC and receives LBTC as collateral from borrowers
• Collateral token risk (LBTC): Lombard BTC is a liquid staking derivative for Bitcoin (similar to Lido's stETH for ETH). Newer than cbBTC or WBTC but used with tight LLTV. Limited track record relative to more established wrapped-BTC products
• Collateral token risk (cbBTC): Coinbase Wrapped BTC — well-established with strong institutional custody. Currently zero exposure
• No leverage at the vault level — the strategy operates as a pure lender, not a borrower
• Oracle risk: Both markets use MorphoChainlinkOracleV2 with Chainlink price feeds. Chainlink is the most battle-tested oracle infrastructure in DeFi. However, oracle manipulation of LBTC/USD (a newer feed) could trigger incorrect liquidations of borrowers, temporarily reducing available liquidity

Provability

• PPS: ERC-4626, fully algorithmic. Vault PPS = convertToAssets(1e18) / 1e18. On-chain at block 25519096: 1.000305
• Strategy totalAssets(): MetaMorpho ERC-4626 → Morpho Blue share math + idle balance. Fully on-chain and verifiable
• Profit / loss reporting: Automated via keeper → StrategyReported events on the vault. Profits unlock over 5 days. Last report: Jul 9, 2026
• Morpho Blue position: Morpho.position(marketId, strategy) → (supplyShares, borrowShares, collateral) — all on-chain

Liquidity Risk

Favorable — 82% idle buffer within the MetaMorpho strategy provides strong redemption capacity. The deployed 18% faces a concentrated, high-utilization Morpho Blue market.

• Exit pipeline: ERC-4626 withdraw → MetaMorpho redeem → Morpho Blue idle market withdrawal (82% of TVL, instant) + LBTC market withdrawal (18% of TVL, constrained). The idle portion redeems atomically; LBTC market withdrawal requires available liquidity or borrower repayments
• Idle liquidity: 38.96 WBTC (82% of TVL) held in Morpho Blue's idle market — effectively cash-equivalent, redeemable on demand
• LBTC market liquidity: 8.55 WBTC supplied to the WBTC/LBTC market at 79.4% utilization. Available liquidity: ~1.85 WBTC. The strategy is 95.2% of market supply, meaning a large withdrawal from this market would exceed available liquidity and require borrowers to repay. In Morpho Blue, borrowers can be liquidated if collateral value drops, restoring liquidity
• Same-asset: WBTC-denominated throughout — no price-divergence risk inside the vault (WBTC/BTC peg risk is upstream at BitGo)
• No DEX liquidity needed — exit is through lending-market unwind, not AMM swap
• No withdrawal queue or cooldown
• Deposit limit: 100,000 WBTC cap vs 47.5 WBTC TVL — materially oversized; not a liquidity issue today, but should be tightened
• MetaMorpho timelock: 3-day delay on market cap changes by the curator — prevents sudden allocation shifts

Liquidity stress scenario: A redemption exceeding ~39 WBTC (the idle buffer) would partially draw from the LBTC market. Given the market's 79.4% utilization and the strategy's 95.2% supply dominance, the strategy may not be able to exit the full position immediately. However, in practice:

1. The idle buffer covers ~82% of TVL, accommodating most conceivable redemptions
2. LBTC borrowers may repay to avoid liquidation if interest rates rise
3. Liquidations would bring in new WBTC supply to the market
4. The curator can rebalance the supply queue (subject to 3-day timelock)

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

Position	Address	Threshold	Roles on Vault
Daddy (ySafe)	0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52	6-of-9	12 of 14 vault roles
Brain	0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7	3-of-8	QUEUE, REPORTING, DEBT, MAX_DEBT, DEPOSIT_LIMIT, WITHDRAW_LIMIT, PROFIT_UNLOCK, DEBT_PURCHASER, EMERGENCY
Security	0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0	4-of-7	DEBT, MAX_DEBT, EMERGENCY
Strategy Manager (Timelock)	0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336b7090767F367BF73	7-day delay	ADD_STRATEGY, REVOKE_STRATEGY, FORCE_REVOKE, ACCOUNTANT, MAX_DEBT
Keeper	0x604e586F17cE106B64185A7a0d2c1Da5bAce711E	Bot	REPORTING only
Debt Allocator	0x1e9eB053228B1156831759401dE0E115356b8671	Bot	REPORTING + DEBT_MANAGER

ySafe 6-of-9 signers include publicly known DeFi contributors — see Yearn Multisig Info.

Properties:

1. No EOA holds vault roles directly
2. Strategy additions and accountant changes pass through 7-day timelock
3. Self-governed timelock — TIMELOCK_ADMIN belongs to the timelock itself
4. Vault contract is immutable — Vyper minimal proxy
5. Same governance pattern across 37+ vaults

Programmability

• PPS: ERC-4626, fully algorithmic
• Vault operations: permissionless deposit / withdraw on-chain
• Strategy reporting: automated via keeper (when strategy is funded)
• Debt allocation: Debt Allocator (automated) + Brain (manual) — fully deployed to MetaMorpho strategy via the vault queue
• Off-chain inputs: none

External Dependencies

The strategy introduces a structured dependency chain. The complete external dependency surface:

Dependency	Criticality	Notes
WBTC (BitGo)	Critical (underlying asset)	Wrapped BTC; relies on BitGo's custody integrity and proof-of-reserves practice. All vault value ultimately depends on WBTC's peg to BTC
Morpho Blue	Critical (for deployed portion)	Immutable lending primitive, ~30 months production, $1B+ markets, 3 top-tier audits. Currently holds 100% of TVL (82% idle + 18% active)
MetaMorpho V1_1	High (strategy layer)	Immutable ERC-4626 wrapper. Audited by Cantina, Spearbit, OpenZeppelin. Yearn-governed (Security as owner, ySafe as guardian)
Chainlink (LBTC/USD oracle)	High (liquidation pricing)	MorphoChainlinkOracleV2 wrapping Chainlink LBTC/USD feed. Oracle failure → incorrect liquidations → temporary illiquidity for LBTC market positions
Chainlink (cbBTC/USD oracle)	Low (no current exposure)	Identical architecture to LBTC oracle. Currently unused
LBTC (Lombard BTC)	Moderate (collateral)	Bitcoin liquid staking derivative. Newer than cbBTC/wBTC. Used as collateral at 94.5% LLTV. If LBTC depegs or has custody issues, borrowers face liquidation, which would release WBTC back to the market (beneficial for lenders) unless the oracle lags
cbBTC (Coinbase BTC)	Low (no current exposure)	Coinbase wrapped Bitcoin. Well-established, strong custody. In supply queue but no position

Concentration note: The strategy is currently single-market for its deployed portion (100% of deployed capital → one WBTC/LBTC market). While only 18% of TVL is deployed, this is a single-point dependency within the deployed segment. The available-but-unused cbBTC market provides a diversification path that the curator can activate.

Oracle dependency depth: Both markets use a two-layer oracle stack:

1. MorphoChainlinkOracleV2 — adapter contract (immutable, Morpho-maintained)
2. Chainlink AggregatorV3 — the underlying price feed

Operational Risk

• Team: Yearn Finance — established 2020, public contributors, named multisig signers
• Vault management: Standard Yearn V3 Role Manager pattern shared across 37+ vaults
• Documentation: Comprehensive Yearn V3 documentation. Strategy code verified on Etherscan
• Legal: Yearn BORG via YIP-87
• Incident response: 4 historical V1 events handled. V3 framework not yet stress-tested by an exploit
• V3 immutability: vault cannot be upgraded
• Operational anomalies:
  • Oversized deposit cap (100,000 WBTC ≈ $6.4B) vs current 47.5 WBTC TVL — not a safety risk while TVL remains low, but should be tightened or its rationale documented. Action item under Reassessment Triggers
  • Not yet in alert_large_flows.py monitoring list — the vault has been live ~14 months with rising TVL. Recommend Yearn adds it before any material TVL increase
  • Strategy-level idle ratio: 82% idle within MetaMorpho is operationally conservative — the curator (2-of-3 Safe) has not raised the LBTC market cap beyond 250 WBTC despite the available 250 WBTC headroom, indicating conservative risk management

Monitoring

Existing Monitoring Infrastructure

Yearn maintains the monitoring repository with active alerting. Important: yvWBTC-1 is NOT yet in the alert_large_flows.py VAULTS dictionary (verified against the script). The other five mainnet risk-1 vaults (yvUSDC-1, yvUSDS-1, yvWETH-1, yvDAI-1, yvUSDT-1) are present. Recommend adding yvWBTC-1 before any meaningful TVL.

Other monitoring that does cover yvWBTC-1 implicitly via the broader Yearn V3 set:

• Endorsed vault check (protocols/yearn/check_endorsed.py) — daily
• Timelock monitoring (protocols/timelock/timelock_alerts.py)

Key Contracts

Contract	Address	Monitor
yvWBTC-1 Vault	0x751F0cC6115410A3eE9eC92d08f46Ff6Da98b708	PPS (convertToAssets(1e8)), totalAssets(), totalDebt(), totalIdle(), Deposit / Withdraw events, StrategyChanged, DebtUpdated
ymv-WBTC (MetaMorpho)	0x2bB005127069A0F0325Fb7370967E8A2b64FB77E	totalAssets(), totalSupply(), convertToAssets(1e8), supply cap changes (setSupplyQueue, submitCap), timelock operations
Morpho Blue	0xBBBBBbbBBb9cC5e90e3b3Af64bdAF62C37EEFFCb	Market state for 0xf6a056… and 0x39d6cc… (totalSupplyAssets, totalBorrowAssets, utilization, fee)
Strategy Manager (Timelock)	0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336b7090767F367BF73	New addStrategy() / revokeStrategy() proposals (7-day delay)
ySafe (Daddy)	0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52	Signer / threshold changes
Security multisig	0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0	MetaMorpho owner: signer / threshold changes
Curator multisig	0x90D0f26025571295D18a6c041E47450B81886B51	Market cap changes, supply queue modifications (3-day timelock)
Accountant	0x5A74Cb32D36f2f517DB6f7b0A0591e09b22cDE69	Fee changes
LBTC / cbBTC Chainlink feeds	LBTC/USD, cbBTC/USD	Oracle deviation, heartbeat, circuit-breaker triggers

Critical Events to Monitor

• Strategy queue changes — additions/removals from get_default_queue()
• Strategy debt changes — DebtUpdated events; watch for debt shifts between idle and LBTC market
• MetaMorpho supply cap changes — submitCap / acceptCap events on the MetaMorpho contract (3-day timelock)
• MetaMorpho supply queue changes — setSupplyQueue by curator
• LBTC market utilization spikes — currently 79.4%; approaching 90%+ significantly degrades withdrawal capacity
• Morpho Blue market parameter changes — LLTV or oracle changes on the active markets (requires new Morpho Blue market creation since core is immutable)
• Emergency actions — vault Shutdown; MetaMorpho guardian (ySafe 6-of-9) can revoke markets from the supply queue and set caps to zero. Morpho Blue core is immutable with no pause mechanism
• ySafe / Brain / Security / Curator signer or threshold changes
• PPS decrease — should only increase outside of explicit loss events
• Deposit-limit changes — particularly relevant given the current oversized cap
• WBTC-specific: BitGo custody / proof-of-reserves issues, WBTC-BTC peg deviation, blacklisting events
• LBTC-specific: Lombard custody issues, LBTC-BTC peg deviation, oracle deviation
• Chainlink oracle incidents affecting LBTC/USD or cbBTC/USD feeds

Monitoring Functions

Function	Contract	Purpose	Frequency
convertToAssets(1e8)	Vault	PPS tracking	Every 6 hours
totalAssets()	Vault	Total TVL	Daily
totalDebt() / totalIdle()	Vault	Capital deployment ratio	Daily
get_default_queue()	Vault	Queue composition	Daily
deposit_limit()	Vault	Cap monitoring (oversized)	Daily
convertToAssets(1e8)	MetaMorpho	Strategy PPS tracking	Every 6 hours
totalAssets()	MetaMorpho	Strategy TVL	Daily
Morpho market(id)	Morpho Blue	LBTC + cbBTC market state (supply, borrow, utilization)	Daily
Morpho position(id, strategy)	Morpho Blue	Strategy supply shares per market	Daily
getThreshold() / getOwners()	ySafe, Security, Curator	Governance integrity	Weekly
getMinDelay()	TimelockController	Delay change detection	Weekly
Chainlink LBTC/USD latestAnswer	Oracle	Oracle deviation monitoring	Every 6 hours

Reassessment Triggers

• Time-based: Reassess in 6 months (January 2027) or annually
• TVL-based: Reassess if TVL exceeds 200 WBTC (~$12.8M at current prices) or changes by ±50%
• Strategy posture:
  • any addStrategy() or revokeStrategy() proposal at the Strategy Manager TimelockController (0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336b7090767F367BF73) targeting yvWBTC-1 — review during the 7-day delay window
  • if a USDS-denominated or Sky-routed strategy is later attached — re-evaluate dependency and concentration scores
  • if additional strategies are attached, re-evaluate the dependency subscore for diversification
• MetaMorpho / Morpho Blue:
  • Any supply cap changes on active markets (3-day curator timelock provides advance notice)
  • Addition or removal of Morpho Blue markets from the MetaMorpho supply queue
  • Any Morpho Blue market parameter change (requires new market creation since core is immutable)
  • Chainlink oracle changes for LBTC/USD or cbBTC/USD feeds
• Allocation shifts:
  • If deployed portion exceeds 50% of TVL (currently 18%)
  • If idle ratio drops below 20% (currently 82%)
  • If a second Morpho market receives a material allocation — re-evaluate diversification
• Underlying-protocol incidents:
  • Any major incident affecting Morpho Blue, MetaMorpho, or WBTC
  • LBTC depeg event, Lombard custody issues, or significant LBTC/USD oracle deviation
  • Chainlink oracle failure or manipulation affecting LBTC or cbBTC feeds
• Action items (operational hygiene):
  • Tighten the deposit cap — current deposit_limit = 100,000 WBTC (~$6.4B at snapshot) is materially above any plausible near-term TVL
  • Add yvWBTC-1 to alert_large_flows.py monitored vault list
• WBTC-specific: BitGo proof-of-reserves issues, sustained WBTC-BTC peg deviation, significant blacklisting / freezing events
• Governance-based: ySafe / Brain / Security / Curator signer or threshold changes; any change to the timelock delays

---

Appendix: Contract Architecture

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         VAULT LAYER                                  │
│                                                                      │
│  ┌───────────────────────┐                                          │
│  │  yvWBTC-1 (v3.0.4)   │                                          │
│  │  ERC-4626, immutable  │                                          │
│  │  0x751F…b708          │                                          │
│  │                       │                                          │
│  │  47.5 WBTC TVL        │                                          │
│  │  ~$3.05M              │                                          │
│  │  totalDebt = 100% TVL │  ← fully deployed to strategy            │
│  │  deposit_limit=100k   │  ← oversized vs TVL                      │
│  └──────────┬────────────┘                                          │
│             │ 100% (47.5 WBTC)                                      │
│             ▼                                                       │
│  ┌───────────────────────┐                                          │
│  │  MetaMorphoV1_1       │  ← Yearn-governed ERC-4626               │
│  │  "ymv-WBTC", immut.   │    Owner: Security 4-of-7                │
│  │  0x2bB0…77E           │    Guardian: ySafe 6-of-9                │
│  │                       │    Curator: 2-of-3 Safe                  │
│  │  totalAssets: 47.51   │    Fee: 0% | Timelock: 3 days            │
│  └────┬────────────┬─────┘                                          │
│       │ 82% idle   │ 18% active                                     │
│       ▼            ▼                                                │
│  ┌─────────┐  ┌──────────────────────┐                              │
│  │ Morpho  │  │ Morpho Blue          │                              │
│  │ Blue    │  │ WBTC/LBTC Market     │                              │
│  │ idle    │  │ (94.5% LLTV)         │                              │
│  │ market  │  │ Oracle: Chainlink     │                              │
│  │         │  │   LBTC/USD           │                              │
│  │ 38.96   │  │ IRM: AdaptiveCurve   │                              │
│  │ WBTC    │  │                       │                              │
│  │         │  │ Strategy: 8.55 WBTC   │                              │
│  └─────────┘  │ Market: 8.98 WBTC    │                              │
│               │ Util: 79.4%           │                              │
│               └──────────────────────┘                              │
│                                                                      │
│  Available but unused:                                               │
│  ┌──────────────────────┐                                           │
│  │ Morpho Blue          │  ← queued, cap 500 WBTC, no position      │
│  │ WBTC/cbBTC Market    │                                           │
│  │ (94.5% LLTV)         │                                           │
│  └──────────────────────┘                                           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Dependency chain: WBTC (BitGo) → yvWBTC-1 → MetaMorpho → Morpho Blue
→ Chainlink (LBTC/USD) + LBTC (Lombard).

All three core contracts (yvWBTC-1, MetaMorpho, Morpho Blue) are immutable.
The vault remains fully outside the Sky / USDS concentration.

Appendix: TimelockController Role Structure

TimelockController 0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336b7090767F367BF73 — same timelock used by 37+ Yearn V3 vaults including all six mainnet risk-1 vaults. getMinDelay() = 604800 (7 days).

Role	Holder	Type	Notes
DEFAULT_ADMIN	No holder	—	Never granted (admin = address(0))
TIMELOCK_ADMIN	Timelock itself	Contract	Self-governed
PROPOSER	Daddy/ySafe	6-of-9 Safe	Sole proposer
EXECUTOR	Daddy/ySafe	6-of-9 Safe	Direct execution
EXECUTOR	TimelockExecutor 0xf8f60bf9456a6e0141149db2dd6f02c60da5779b	Contract	Wrapper: Brain (3/8) + deployer EOA can call execute() through it
CANCELLER	Daddy/ySafe	6-of-9 Safe	Cancel pending proposals
CANCELLER	Brain	3-of-8 Safe	Cancel pending proposals

To shorten the delay, Daddy 6/9 must propose updateDelay(), wait 7 days during which Brain or Daddy can cancel, then execute. DEFAULT_ADMIN was never granted, so no party can self-grant PROPOSER or TIMELOCK_ADMIN to skip the flow.